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Hillary Clinton Lineit Will Never Happen Again


Clinton supporters attend a rally in Tempe, Arizona, on November 2. (Daniel Acker/Bloomberg)

Many Democrats accept believed that a coalition of minorities, millennials and single women would assist create a new Democratic majority for years to come up. Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign was counting on it.

But the "rising American electorate," as it'south called, failed to deport Clinton across the finish line. Information technology didn't even come close. According to national exit polls, among Latino voters she fell six points from President Obama's numbers in 2012; she dropped 5 points each among eighteen-to-29-yr-olds, unmarried women and African Americans. Together, these groups fabricated upward the aforementioned percentage of the electorate in 2016 equally they had in 2012. Some of the battleground-state figures are even more striking. In Ohio, Clinton was 13 points behind Obama among 18-to-29-year-olds. In New Mexico, she brutal xi points among Latinos.

Why did the Democrats' strategy fail so miserably? Ultimately, because they overestimated the force of a coalition based on identity politics.

This strategy goes back, unfortunately, to "The Emerging Democratic Bulk," a volume Ruy Teixeira and I wrote in 2002. We argued that by the terminate of the first decade of the century, a progressive-centrist coalition based on professionals, women, minorities and "close to an even split" of the white working class would create majorities for Democrats.

That's what happened in 2006 and 2008. But in the wake of the Dandy Recession, Republicans were able to convince many white working-grade voters that Obama administration policies had bypassed them, leading to a Republican wave in 2010.

Liberal Democrats consoled themselves with a modification of our theory. They argued that demographics were trending in their favor, with a growing portion of the electorate represented by unmarried women, millennials and "people of color" (a highly misleading catch-bag term). In their view, Democrats didn't need to worry so much about the shrinking white working course. Proponents of the "rising American electorate" theory included pollsters Stanley Greenberg and Celinda Lake; Page Gardner, the president of the Voter Participation Eye; and senior analysts from the Center for American Progress. Final yr Gardner promised that "the Rising American Electorate will be game changers in the upcoming elections."

Clinton's campaign put a version of the theory — with the addition of a few other groups, such every bit people with disabilities — into practise. It ran ads targeted at these voters, including more 2,500 Spanish-language ads from January through September. Clinton anointed vocaliser Katy Perry and tv star Lena Dunham equally surrogates to court the millennial vote and chosen on LeBron James , BeyoncĂ© and Jay Z to assistance get out the black vote. And the campaign hoped that her historic candidacy would appeal to the key group of unmarried women. At the Democratic convention, Clinton first appeared in a video showing her breaking a drinking glass ceiling.

She sought to unite her coalition with a vision of inclusivity and a hope to accelerate the fortunes of each group (Latinos, for instance, got clearing reform, and millennials got relief from student debt), along with a alert that Donald Trump — who conveniently managed to insult each of Clinton's target groups at one signal or another — meant them harm.

But Democrats can't win elections simply by appealing to the identity groups of the rising American electorate. These groups don't add up to a sure bulk unless ane assumes the Democrat wins near-unanimity amongst them and the Republican simply blank majorities or less amongst Republican-trending groups. Besides such traditional GOP constituencies as farmers, small-business people and managers, three groups of voters accept become increasingly Republican: the white working class, divers as whites without a four-twelvemonth college degree; whites with a four-twelvemonth higher caste merely non an advanced degree; and seniors. While the proportional numbers of the white working course take been shrinking over the by few decades, they remain formidable, specially in battleground states, and the numbers of iv-year-degree whites and seniors have not been failing.

Hither'southward a back-of-the-envelope calculation: If you get out out white voters with advanced degrees — who by a modest majority have backed Democrats — then whites without higher degrees and with four-twelvemonth degrees made up about lx percentage of the electorate, and much higher shares in states like Ohio, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Iowa, on which the election turned. In Ohio and Wisconsin, for instance, these groups equanimous somewhere between 75 and 80 percent of the electorate. The Republicans got about 60 percentage of their vote, which was enough to win these states regardless of the Democrats' large margins among nonwhites or Clinton'south success amongst single women and millennials.

What about the future? Won't America'southward turn toward a majority-minority nation — which the census forecasts for 2044 — create an automatic Autonomous majority? Much of that reasoning rests on the rise population of Hispanics and on an assumption, implicit in a term similar "people of color," that as Latinos age, settle, and move up the income and education ladder, as other minorities have done, they will remain loyal Democrats.

Only there are signs that Hispanics are post-obit a trajectory more similar to that of the Irish than African Americans. In the American National Ballot Report of the 2012 vote, Hispanic support for Obama was 70 per centum among those with only a high school diploma simply 55 percent amidst those with some college. (In that location is no like data available yet for 2016.)

There is likewise a political dissever between first-generation immigrants and American-born Hispanics. According to a Gallup poll in August, Clinton enjoyed a far greater edge over Trump amongst strange-born Hispanics than amongst those born in the U.s.. According to a Pew poll, bilingual Hispanics were far more supportive of Clinton than those who speak merely English.

And there is a further complication. As sociologist Richard Alba has contended, when Hispanics intermarry with whites, they often identify their children as white. These, of course, are elusive socio-political categories masquerading every bit racial or national designations, only the liberals who argue that a bulk-minority nation will favor Democrats are basing their claim on how voters place themselves.

It is equally difficult to brand a case that younger voters volition inevitably tilt Democratic. In Iowa this yr, Trump and Clinton split the xviii-to-29-year-old vote that Obama had won easily. In Missouri, where younger votes backed Obama by 58 to 39 percent in 2012, they supported Trump this fourth dimension by 51 to 40 pct. And in national and several key state surveys, there is some evidence that Democrats are losing their sure grip on 30-something millennials.

None of this suggests the converse: that the Republicans, with their current majorities of the white working course, four-twelvemonth higher graduates and older voters, have a lock on the presidency or Congress. What it suggests is that politics matters.

In the United States, our party coalitions are heterogeneous. The New Bargain Democrats grouped together Northern big-urban center ethnics with Southern whites and matrimony leaders with Texas oilmen. The Reagan coalition brought together Walmart and country-society Republicans. Obama'due south coalition included Wall Street and Silicon Valley loftier rollers forth with the inner-city poor. But the key to winning elections has been to define a majority that can include your coalition as well as a significant slice of your rival'due south.

Politicians and parties have traditionally washed this by purporting to champion the people (defined variously as the centre class, the forgotten Americans, the common man) confronting an elite of some kind that is blocking the achievement of a goal that the people hold dear. The existence of a common adversary is essential to holding together what might otherwise exist feuding groups. Ronald Reagan's coalition was united by a common opposition to "big government" liberals who were soft on communism. This year, Trump championed the "silent majority" (a Richard Nixon term) and Franklin Roosevelt's "forgotten America" confronting an establishment that was standing in the mode of "making America great once again."

Politics, of course, is vastly more than complicated than this, and then is bodily governing. But our successful politicians accept adhered to this elementary formula and accept subsumed their platforms and programs on merchandise, taxes, immigration and foreign policy under it.

For Clinton, the adversary was Trump, but it was also, every bit the campaign developed, the "basket of deplorables" who backed him. While Clinton claimed she meant only a subset of Trump's white working-class supporters, her charge was taken — with some justice — as applying to the group in its entirety. Then instead of creating a majority that included her base plus a significant slice of potential Republican voters, Clinton defined her coalition against them. (Many liberal pundits reinforced this perception by repeatedly characterizing Trump's voters every bit poorly informed and racist, fifty-fifty though in 2008 and 2012 many of these voters backed Obama.)

Infused with the promise of a ascension American electorate, Clinton wrote off the meaning slice of voters Democrats need — in states similar Ohio, Michigan and Wisconsin — to win majorities. But she too failed, except among unmarried and college-educated women, to sufficiently rouse her target groups. Millennials, it turns out, intendance about more than than the relief of their student debts. Hispanics don't necessarily rate immigration reform first among their concerns, and many of them are as leery of illegal immigration equally one of Trump's so-called deplorables. They want a larger vision of the future. In this twelvemonth's election, Clinton didn't requite it to them, and for that reason her vote fell curt even amongst the groups she relied on.

Twitter: @JohnBJudis

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Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-identity-politics-couldnt-clinch-a-clinton-win/2016/11/11/ed3bf966-a773-11e6-8fc0-7be8f848c492_story.html